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Associate Professor Lian Qi, Dean of the Department of Supply Chain Management, Rutgers Business School, was invited to give a report

[Mingli Lecture Hall 27th, 2020] 

On November 5, 2020, the 27th issue of the Mingli Lecture Hall of our school was fortunate to invite Associate Professor Lian Qi, Dean of the Supply Chain Management Department of the Rutgers University Business School, to bring us the title "Dynamic Contract under Quick Response in a Supply" "Chain with Information Asymmetry" academic report, the report adopts the form of Tencent conference. Special researcher Zhang Yuli from the School of Management and Economics of Beijing Institute of Technology took the lead in this academic activity. More than 150 scholars and students from the School of Management and Economics of Beijing Institute of Technology, Tianjin University, Southeast University, Nanjing University of Science and Technology and other sister universities participated in this lecture.

In this report, Associate Professor Lian Qi considers the fact that manufacturers cannot obtain market demand information, while retailers can obtain demand information during the sales period, and analyzes the decision-making and profitability of a supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer problem. The problem considers a single product with uncertain demand, a long production cycle and a short sales cycle, and three modes of supply are modeled, namely: (1) The manufacturer only provides sales contracts with lower prices during the production period; (2) The manufacturer provides a sales contract with a lower price during the production period, and a quick response contract with a higher price during the sales period; (3) On the basis of (2), the manufacturer provides excess production as inventory during the production period to meet the rapid Respond to the contract. By comparing the maximum profits and optimal decisions of the parties under different supply modes, it is shown that (1) rapid response contracts may harm the profits of manufacturers; (2) the increase of rapid response costs is beneficial to manufacturers but not to retailers; (3) Inventory, because it reduces the flexibility of the manufacturer, is not conducive to the manufacturer and is conducive to the retailer. The report received a enthusiastic response. After the meeting, the participating scholars and students conducted in-depth discussions on related issues.

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