題目：The consistency of intraday timing of corporate disclosure releases
主講人：Jennifer Wu Tucker（University of Florida）
時(shí)間：2017年6月7日（星期三）14:30
地點(diǎn)：主樓241會(huì)議室
主講人簡(jiǎn)介：
Jennifer Wu Tucker先后畢業(yè)于University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ,New York University, 獲會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)碩士和博士學(xué)位。目前就職于State University of New York at Stony Brook。他有多篇成果發(fā)表于國(guó)際權(quán)威期刊The Accounting Review ，Contemporary Accounting Research, Review of Accounting Studies, Accounting, Organizations and Society和 Journal of Accounting Research。擔(dān)任多家著名期刊審搞人與編輯，并獲多種獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)。
內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介：
Firms may release their disclosure, including regulatory filings, in four intraday windows: before the market open, during the market open, after the market close, and overnight. We examine the consistency (or lack of consistency) of firms’ using an intraday window to release common types of disclosure. We find that firms with high operating risks, poor earnings performance, and auditor changes deviate more often from existing intraday timing patterns than do other firms and that firms with more analyst coverage deviate less from existing timing patterns. These findings could be interpreted as managers using their discretion to allow investors to better process a disclosure before trading (“efficient motive”) or to hide the news (“opportunistic motive”). To understand which motive dominates, we examine the association of intraday timing deviations with another setting in which managers use their discretion—earnings reporting. We find that firms that deviate more often from existing intraday timing patterns manipulate earnings to a larger degree. This result suggests that intraday timing deviations are, on average, opportunistic. Our study advances the understanding of how managers use their discretion in financial reporting and disclosure.
（承辦：會(huì)計(jì)系，科研與學(xué)術(shù)交流中心）
