題 目： A Responsive-Pricing Retailer Sourcing from Competing Suppliers Facing Disruptions
主講人： Tao Li （Santa Clara University）
時(shí) 間：2017年12月19日下午15:30
地 點(diǎn)：主樓418室
主講人介紹：
Tao Li joined the Operations Management & Information Systems department in the Leavey School of Business at Santa Clara University in Fall 2012 as an assistant professor. Professor Li’s research interests include supply chain management with a special emphasis on sourcing strategy with unreliable suppliers, supply chain coordination, and the operations-marketing interface. His scholarship has appeared in leading academic journals such as Production and Operations Management, European Journal of Operational Research.
Professor Li serves as a senior editor and a member of editorial review board for Production and Operations Management and the treasurer of the Chinese Scholars Association for Management Science and Engineering. He has been a regular reviewer for top journals including Management Science, Operations Research, and Manufacturing & Service Operations Management.
內(nèi)容介紹：
(1) Problem definition: We study a problem of a retailer who orders from two competing strategic suppliers subject to independent or correlated disruptions and responds by setting the retail price upon delivery, which we call responsive pricing. The suppliers compete by setting their wholesale prices.
(2) Academic / Practical Relevance: Supplier disruption correlation exists for a large number of reasons, such as product and service designs, geographic proximity, common suppliers. In practice, after the supply uncertainty is resolved, most retailers do have the ability to adjust the product price. Therefore, it is important to study a responsive-pricing retailer's sourcing problem with correlated suppliers.
(3) Methodology: We model this problem as a Stackelberg-Nash game with the suppliers as the leaders and the retailer as the follower, and obtain its equilibrium explicitly. We perform sensitivity analyses with respect to suppliers’ production costs, reliabilities and their correlation.
(4) Results: We show that reducing production cost is a supplier's only way to enter the market, while improving reliability without reducing cost can only make the entry harder. Surprisingly, we find that an increase in the reliability of a supplier may, counter to our intuition, hurt him. Furthermore, we find that a high disruption correlation may bene?t a supplier who has a cost advantage.
(5) Managerial Implications: This paper has important implications for unreliable suppliers because how reliability and correlation influence their profits depends on the retailer's pricing power. With a responsive-pricing retailer, a supplier may not benefit from a higher reliability but may benefit from a higher correlation. This explains why a supplier that has a cost advantage may have the incentive to create a positively correlated supply network by building plants in the same geographic location with his competitor, or choosing the same tier 2 supplier to form a ``diamond-shaped" supply chain strategically.
（承辦：技術(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)及管理系，科研與學(xué)術(shù)交流中心）
