時間：2019年12月18日11:20-12:40
地點：主樓418
報告內(nèi)容摘要：
We study an assembly system where n upstream complementary suppliers produce components and sell them to a downstream manufacturer. The manufacturer assembles all the components into final products and sells them in the final market. The demand for final products is assumed to be deterministic and sensitive to both the selling price set by the manufacturer and the quality-improvement effort levels of all suppliers. The suppliers may form coalitions to better coordinate their wholesale pricing and quality-improvement effort decisions. We analyze the stability of coalition structures by adopting farsighted stability concepts. To characterize supplier’s profit allocation in a coalition, we consider three allocation rules, including the equal allocations, the proportional allocations and the Shapley value allocations. The results show that the grand coalition is always stable under both the equal allocations and the proportional allocations. However, under the Shapley value allocations, the grand coalition is stable only when the suppliers’ quality efficiencies have relatively small differences. Conditions under which the suppliers will not act independently are presented as well. Because of the positive externalities of quality improvements, we demonstrate that coalitions of suppliers with lower quality efficiencies could benefit from free-riding on the investments of coalitions of suppliers with higher quality efficiencies in the system.
報告人簡介：
陳俊霖，中央財經(jīng)大學(xué)管理科學(xué)與工程學(xué)院副教授，清華大學(xué)工業(yè)工程系博士，美國加州大學(xué)伯克利分校訪問學(xué)者，加拿大圭爾夫大學(xué)訪問學(xué)者。研究方向為供應(yīng)鏈風(fēng)險管理，行為運作管理。目前已在《Decision Sciences》、《European Journal of Operational Research》、《管理科學(xué)學(xué)報》等國內(nèi)外知名期刊發(fā)表論文數(shù)十篇。主持國家自然科學(xué)基金青年基金項目、國家自然科學(xué)基金中德國際合作研究項目子課題、北京市社科基金一般項目、中財121人才工程青年博士發(fā)展基金等項目多項。兼任中國運籌學(xué)會行為運籌與管理分會理事、中國運籌學(xué)會隨機服務(wù)與運作管理分會理事。
（承辦：管理科學(xué)與物流系、科研與學(xué)術(shù)交流中心）
