時(shí)間：2019年12月18日10:00-11:20
地點(diǎn)：主樓418
報(bào)告內(nèi)容摘要:
We consider a random number of strategic customers who compete for a limited stock of products, and decide whether to buy a product at full price now or at a discount price by waiting until the end of the selling season. This decision is not trivial, as waiting leads to not only a lower cost, but also less value due to a possible stockout caused by the limited product quantity. The equilibrium analysis of the competition game based on a theoretical model predicts that strategic customers wait for the discount price when their private product valuations at the end of the selling season are above a threshold. We conduct a laboratory experiment to study strategic customers’ decisions and find that significantly fewer customers wait than predicted when the stock quantity is high, but not when the stock quantity is low. Our behavioral models with their structural estimates reveal that the strategic customers’ behavior is caused by decision biases of bounded rationality and risk aversion. These findings imply that a retailer should take account of decision biases when deciding on the optimal stock quantity because the decision biases of strategic customers benefit the retailer when stock quantity is high, but may not benefit them when stock quantity is low.
報(bào)告人簡(jiǎn)介：
宋亞楠，博士畢業(yè)于清華大學(xué)工業(yè)工程系，中國(guó)科學(xué)院數(shù)學(xué)與系統(tǒng)科學(xué)研究院博士后，現(xiàn)任北京科技大學(xué)東凌經(jīng)濟(jì)偉德國(guó)際1946bv官網(wǎng)管理科學(xué)與工程系副教授，碩士生導(dǎo)師。主要研究領(lǐng)域包括：行為運(yùn)作管理、共享經(jīng)濟(jì)、收益管理、策略型消費(fèi)者行為等。主持完成博士后面上項(xiàng)目一項(xiàng)，優(yōu)秀博士后項(xiàng)目一項(xiàng)，正在主持自然科學(xué)基金青年基金一項(xiàng)，北京市社會(huì)科學(xué)基金一項(xiàng)，校人才項(xiàng)目一項(xiàng)。代表作發(fā)表于領(lǐng)域內(nèi)國(guó)際頂級(jí)期刊《Production & Operations Management》，以及JCR一區(qū)期刊《International Journal of Production Economics》等。主要社會(huì)任職包括：北京運(yùn)籌學(xué)會(huì)理事，中國(guó)運(yùn)籌學(xué)會(huì)行為運(yùn)作管理學(xué)會(huì)理事，INFORMS會(huì)員、POMs會(huì)員，同時(shí)擔(dān)任了多個(gè)知名期刊的審稿人。
（承辦：管理科學(xué)與物流系、科研與學(xué)術(shù)交流中心）
