時(shí)間：2019年12月27日9:00-10:00
地點(diǎn)：主樓429
報(bào)告內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介:
We study the multifaceted impact of loan programs initiated by a retail platform to its sellers on these sellers’ operational and financing decisions, profits of the sellers and the platform, as well as consumer welfare. Many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) on retail platforms face capital constraints that limit their ability to meet market demand. Due to lack of sufficient asset and credit history, SMEs also face the challenge of securing loans from traditional banks. Therefore, the financial loan decisions of a retail platform to its SMEs have become an essential part of the platform design. We develop a two-stage game-theoretic model where multiple SMEs who face financial constraints compete on a retail platform, and the platform decides who to offer financial loans and what are the loan credit lines. We show that the competitive landscape on the platform greatly affects the effectiveness of the platform's loan programs. Offering a generous loan to a monopoly seller on the platform benefits all stakeholders. Offering generous loans to competing sellers, however, can make sellers worse-off in the equilibrium where they are willing to accept the loans -- a prisoner's dilemma. The platform can, by strategically setting the loan limit, reduce the intensity of the prisoner's dilemma for sellers in high or moderate need of funds. Two factors -- the platform's required rate of return and referral fee -- affect the platform's willingness-to-lend and the interaction between the platform and the sellers. We also find that offering asymmetric loans to symmetric competing sellers can benefit both the platform and the sellers as a whole. The research findings provide useful implications for retail platforms on how to offer financial loans to sellers based not only on an individual seller's characteristics but also on the competition in the marketplace. From a government perspective, our research also sheds light on the impact of a platform's loan decisions on consumer welfare and how such decisions should be regulated.
報(bào)告人簡(jiǎn)介：
任龍，對(duì)外經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)助理教授，于2018年從清華大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)偉德國(guó)際1946bv官網(wǎng)取得博士學(xué)位，圣路易斯華盛頓大學(xué)訪問(wèn)學(xué)者。他的研究興趣包括運(yùn)營(yíng)管理、電子商務(wù)與優(yōu)化，以第一或者通訊作者在國(guó)際國(guó)內(nèi)主流期刊《Fuzzy Sets & Systems》《International Journal of Production Economics》《中國(guó)管理科學(xué)》《管理工程學(xué)報(bào)》等發(fā)表論文近十篇，作為主持人承擔(dān)教育部人文社科青年項(xiàng)目1項(xiàng)，目前擔(dān)任國(guó)際期刊《Decision Sciences》《Electronic Commerce Research and Applications》《IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy sets and Systems》《IEEE Access》《International Journal of Production Economics》等雜志的審稿人，同時(shí)也是INFORMS、POMS、SIAM、IEEE協(xié)會(huì)會(huì)員。
（承辦：管理科學(xué)與物流系、科研與學(xué)術(shù)交流中心）
