題目：Do Managers Put Their Money Where Their Mouths Are? Evidence from Insider Trading after Conference Calls
主講人：李煦副教授（香港大學(xué)）
時(shí)間：2014年3月12日 上午10:00
地點(diǎn)：主樓418會議室
主講人簡介：
李煦，香港大學(xué)會計(jì)系副教授，早年分別畢業(yè)于Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Boston College和對外經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)，分獲博士、碩士和學(xué)士。 曾在Lehigh University 和University of Texas at Dallas從事教學(xué)工作。文章發(fā)表于The Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting and Economics,Journal of Financial Research，Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis，Research in Accounting Regulation, Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting,, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting等國際權(quán)威期刊。研究興趣有the capital market’s reaction on accounting information, information intermediaries, insider trading and information asymmetry, characteristics and impact of firms’ disclosure, institutional investors’ trading behavior. 多個知名國際期刊審稿人。
內(nèi)容簡介：
We examine the relation between the tone of conference calls presented by company executives and their subsequent insider trading behavior. Our findings reveal a significant discrepancy between word and deed – simply stated, managers do not appear to put their money where their mouths are. We find that positive conference call tones predict net insider selling, and negative conference call tones predict net insider buying. We show that this inverse tone-insider trading pattern is unlikely to be the consequence of simple contrarian trading strategies on the part of insiders. Additional tests reveal stronger inverse tone-insider trading patterns for CEOs, the executives most responsible for setting conference call tones, than for non-CEO executives. We also find a significantly stronger inverse relation for small firms than for large firms, consistent with expectations that a weaker information environment makes it easier for CEOs to trade against the tone of their conference call.
