報告1：Analysis of Product Rollover Strategies in the Presence of Strategic Customers
報告2：Feedback Stackelberg Equilibrium in Mixed Leadership Games with an Application to Cooperative Advertising
主講人：Sethi Suresh Pal 博士（加拿大皇家科學院院士、杰出教授）
時間： 2014年9月15日10點/2014年9月16日10點
地點：主樓六層會議室
主講人簡介：
Suresh P. Sethi任教于德克薩斯大學達拉斯分校，現為加拿大皇家科學院院士，Charles & Nancy Davidson運作管理的杰出教授，智能供應網絡中心主任(the Center for Intelligent Supply Networks)。Sethi教授在運作管理、營銷、工業工程、最優控制等領域做出了杰出貢獻，最為人熟知是Sethi advertising model、DNSS Points以及有關最優控制的教科書，如Optimal Control Theory: Applications to Management Science and Economics。Sethi教授在國際主流期刊上發表學術論文264篇，其中Management Science 11篇, Operations Research 17篇, Production and Operations Management 16篇, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 5篇。Sethi教授現為Production and Operations Management協會主席，同時擔任Production and Operations Management期刊（UT Dallas 24種頂級期刊之一）的Department Editor，SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization的責任編輯，Automatica的副主編。現擔任Management Science、Operations Research(OR)、IIE Transactions(IIE) 、Manufacturing & Service Operations Management等多種權威期刊的審稿專家。
內容簡介：
報告1：Frequent product introductions emphasize the importance of product rollover strategies. With single rollover, when a new product is introduced, the old product is phased out from the market. With dual rollover, the old product remains in the market along with the new product. Anticipating the introduction of the new product and the potential markdown of the old product, strategic customers may delay their purchases. We study the interaction between product rollover strategies and strategic customer purchasing behavior and find that single rollover is more valuable when the new product's innovation is low and the number of strategic customers is high. Interestingly and counter to intuition, the firm may have to charge a lower price for the old product as well as receive a lower profit with a higher value disposal (outside) option for the old product under single rollover. Facing a market composed of both strategic and myopic customers, the firm does not necessarily reduce the stocking level as more myopic customers become strategic.
報告2：We study mixed leadership differential games in which a player acts as a leader for some decisions and as a follower for the remaining ones. We partition all decisions into lead and follow-up decisions in the sense that the follow-up decisions are obtained simultaneously as the optimal responses to the lead decisions. Clearly, this involves both Nash and Stackelberg steps. Furthermore, given the optimal responses, the lead decisions are made simultaneously also as a Nash step. Thus, the procedure of finding a feedback Stackelberg equilibrium of the game requires Nash and Stackelberg steps in a nested fashion. We apply the procedure to a cooperative advertising supply chain where the manufacturer and the retailer decide their national and local advertising efforts for selling a product as the follow-up decisions, in response to the participation rates for these efforts provided by the retailer and the manufacturer as their lead decisions, respectively. We discuss the insights obtained from the results. A second application of the procedure to a linear-quadratic game concludes the paper.
