題目：Perk Consumption and Bank Performance:A case study based on Chinese Commercial Banks
主講人：羅丹 博士（University of Reading）
時間：2016年7月4日上午9：00-11:00
地點：主樓422
主講人介紹：
Dr Dan Luo is an Associate Professor in Accounting and Financial Management in Henley Business School, University of Reading. Before she joined the Henley Business School, she worked in the School of Contemporary Chinese Studies (SCCS) from May 2011 to June 2016 as an assistance professor in Business and Finance. She previously worked as a research fellow in the Centre of Global Finance, University of the West of England. Before that, she worked as a post-doctorate research fellow at SCCS, The University of Nottingham, where she was awarded her PhD and MA in Finance and Investment. She obtained her BA (Hons) Management in Accounting and Finance from Beijing Institute of Technology, China in 2005. She has also been a member of the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) since 2007.
內容介紹：
Executive compensation, due to its complex nature and the close relationship with firms’ performance and shareholders’ wealth creation, has been intensively studied (Kato and Long, 2005; Firth et al., 2006). In general, compensation to the executives is mainly comprised with three components: extrinsic monetary rewards in the form of salary and bonus; long-term incentives in the form of equity-based payments and perquisites, such as club membership, company cars, housing and pension contributions, etc. Perquisites, or perks, could be defined as a non-monetary compensation offered to employees at all levels but are mainly consumed by the top executives. As an important but controversial component of managerial compensation, perks have been of long-term interests to researchers but only limited studied have been done on the topic due to data limitation.
Given the critical role played by banks in an economy, the closer alignment of the interests between bank managers and shareholders may lead to further efficiency gain and the better allocation of financial resource. Currently, due to long-term policy oriented lending behaviour among Chinese commercial banks and the close relationship between bank directors and the government, compensations to the bank managers are claimed to be relationship-based rather than market-based (Luo and Jackson, 2012). However, as poor bank CEO incentives has been criticized as one of the fundamental causes of the financial crisis, commercial banks in China should design executive remuneration package carefully to address the principal-agent problem more effectively. This has therefore made more detailed understanding of the relationship between an optional contract, mainly through the provision of additional non-cash compensations, and bank performance even more compelling. This is the gap our study aims to fill.
（承辦：會計系，科研與學術交流中心）
