題目：Economic Consequences of FAS 123R: Evidence from Private Loan Contracts
主講人：Tao Ma（University of South Carolina）
時(shí)間：2016年7月28日15點(diǎn)
地點(diǎn)：主樓422會(huì)議室
主講人簡(jiǎn)介：
Tao Ma is currently an Associate Professor of Accounting at school of accounting of University of South Carolina. He holds a Ph.D. in Accounting from Washington University in St. Louis, a M.S. in University of Texas at Brownsville at Brownsville, TX, and a B.A. in Philosophy and Religion from Minzu University of China. His research interests are in financial disclosure and corporate governance, with a focus on Financial accounting research on the economic consequences of accounting information and accounting conservatism. His research has been published in leading academic journals such as The Accounting Review(forthcoming), Journal of Business Finance & accounting and Journal of Private Equity. Professor Ma’s teaching interests include Advanced Financial Accounting and International Financial Accounting.
內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介：
We examine how management stock options affect corporate risk taking. We exploit exogenous variation in stock option grants generated by FAS 123R and use loan spreads to infer risk taking. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that the spreads of loans taken by firms that did not expense options before FAS 123R (treated firms) significantly decrease after FAS 123R relative to firms that either did not issue stock options or voluntarily expensed stock options before 123R (control firms). We also find that loans taken by the treated firms are less likely to contain collateral requirements and are less likely to have covenants restricting capital investment post FAS 123R. Furthermore, the treatment effect is stronger for firms with high agency conflicts associated with risk-shifting.
（承辦：會(huì)計(jì)系，科研與學(xué)術(shù)交流中心）
